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When the Socialist system of central planning collapsed within a
very short time span of two years (end 1989-end 1991), Western
European countries, individually as well as collectively, were
confronted with a trade-off between the political and economic
rationale of supporting -the transformation process through
integration widening.
Politically, there were important arguments to support this
process through strong signals, such as rapid institutional
association to the EC legal framework, massive financial
transfers to the East, and free trade conditions. Such signals
were expected to prevent political turmoil and social unrest in
Eastern Europe from becoming a threat to political stability in
neighbouring Western Europe. Furthermore, they were believed to
discourage large-scale labour migration, to control the Eastern
military potential and its conversion into civil use, and to
mitigate the threat of other negative cross-border externalities
such as the poor safety standards of nuclear energy plants in
Eastern Europe.
The economic rationale, however, had a number of arguments to ask
for more cautiousness in integration widening, for more
gradualism and for weaker signals. Such arguments pointed to the
limited absorptive capacity of Eastern countries in institutional
terms as well as in terms of human capital endowment, to the
scrap value of the existing physical capital stock if this stock
would be exposed too rapidly to world market competition, and to
the large amount of financial transfers needed to minimise the
adverse social effects of economic transformation accelerated by
integration widening.
Paper prepared for the Workshop "Economic Interdependence Between North America, Asia and Europe: New
Challenges for the 1990s", organised by the Institute for Economic Development and Policy, East-West Center,
Honolulu/Hawaii, 25-26 August 1992, Chiang Mai, Thailand.Unlike in East Germany where the political rationale of shockwise
integration widening clearly dominated over the "gradualist"
strategy recommended by many economists, controversies between
the political and economic rationale of integration widening
towards Eastern Europe were less pronounced. The first generation
of Eastern European countries under transformation (CSFR, Poland,
Hungary) while being accepted as associates with options for
future membership was given sufficient control over important
policy buffers like the :national exchange rate policy, monetary
policies or the national regulatory framework. The same holds
true for the second generation of countries (Bulgaria, Romania,
Albania, Baltic states) which do not yet enjoy the status of
associates, not to speak of CIS states which are still excluded
from any type of institutional access to the EC framework.
However, the political rationale of moving rapidly towards
integration widening has also influenced the EC-Eastern Europe
relations. This emerges from the extraordinarily short period of
negotiating the so-called Europe Agreements between the EC and
the first generation countries within one year only. Without
considerable pressure from the. political side such speed would
have not been possible as economic disputes on the timetable of
bilateral trade liberalisation and on the exclusion list went
deeply into the nitty-gritties of individual products
(particularly in agriculture) , not to speak of other non-trade-
related issues.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss first whether the
relative dominance of the political rationale in the negotiations
made the Europe Agreements more meaningful and substantive in
their economic substance than they had been if the economic
rationale of carefully balancing vested interests of domestic
producers, consumers, taxpayers and third countries had
prevailed. This discussion includes the first generation
countries as well as the other . Eastern European countries
(Chapters II-IV).In a second step (Chapter V), the third country implications are
highlighted. Finally, it is shown that the EC will follow a
selected approach of concentric circles in integration widening
by differentiating between the first, second and third generation
of Eastern European associates.
II. Integration Widening towards the First Generation Countries
(CSFR, Poland, Hungary): Much Ado about Nothing?
Western Europe is a "natural" trading partner of the three
countries. Historical trade patterns from the inter-war period-as
well as the simulation of "normal" trade patterns using gravity
models (with economic size and distance the major determinants of
the direction of trade) suggest that Eastern European countries
would direct the largest share of their exports to Western
Europe. Havrylyshyn and Pritchett [1991] estimate that about 75
per cent of Eastern European exports (including countries like
Romania but not Bulgaria) would normally be directed to Western
Europe. It is important to note that the type of institutional
affiliation with Western Europe (preferential trading
arrangement, free trade agreement or full membership) , does not
affect the geographical trade patterns but the degree of outward
orientation of Eastern Europe (exports/GNP). This degree would be
higher if the affiliation would become closer. In other words,
most trade would be anyhow with Western Europe. The effects of
integration widening would be mirrored in the ratio between
export demand and domestic absorption of the Eastern European
countries and not in the share of Western Europe in their
exports.
In this respect, the three Europe Agreements of December 1991
with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR), Poland and
Hungary (in the following called "the associates") including
their trade policy parts which came into force by so-called
Interim Agreements on 1 March 1992, have to be submitted to adouble test. First, do they provide an external anchor which
supports the transformation process in the three countries in
such a way that exports become less discriminated against
production for the domestic market than without the institutional
affiliation? Secondly, if the incentive system is actually moving
towards more neutrality between export demand and domestic
demand, has the EC really opened its markets to ensure that this
export supply is absorbed by the Community?
The first question is much more difficult to answer than the
second one as the Agreements impact indirectly and qualitatively
on the internal transformation process through many tentative and
intangible channels. Furthermore, this impact will take time and
thus will not materialise immediately.
To mention two of the channels, the EC acknowledges that the
final objective of the Agreements is full membership. To achieve
this target, the three countries' existing and future legislation
has to approximate that of the Community. For this purpose, the
Community offers a wide basket of measures of economic co-
operation, industrial co-operation, investment promotion,
^monetary co-operation, education and training in all relevant
sectors, plus financial assistance through the G-24 PHARE
programme and the European Investment Bank plus balance of
payments support. An Association Council is going to screen the
approximation process permanently. While this Council speaks with
a soft voice, it carries a big stick in terms of judging on the
appropriateness (or inappropriateness) of the approximation
process and thus on the chances of full membership.
To conclude on this point, there is probably more external
support for the CSFR, Poland and Hungary than any non-member
country including the ACP countries has ever received from theCommunity.
1 But this support is still purely complementary and
not substitutive to strong own efforts of the associates. The
uphill task of economic transformation rests with the associates
themselves.
The second channel is more straightforward and operates through
opening the three countries/ markets to EC suppliers. Here, some
inconsistencies and loopholes can be observed. The free trade
provisions are asymmetric in the sense that the associates can
postpone the sensitive issues of opening their markets to the end
of a ten-years period. Given the fact that markets are more
;strongly protected in Eastern Europe than in the Community
2, it
is likely that the three countries will face an "adjustment jam"
at the end of the period if they use the options of postponing
trade liberalisation.
Important sectors like real estate, banking and insurance enjoy
infant industry protection and a number of general and special
safeguards and escape clauses introduce inequalities between
sectors as far as the adjustment pressure is concerned. While the
motives to protect the associates against external shocks of
immediately strong competition should not be generally
discredited, what gives rise to concern is the degree of fine-
tuning in discretionarily segmenting privileged sectors from
non-privileged ones. In doing so, the countries encourage strong
1 The EC part in financial assistance under PHARE (Pologne Hongrie Assistance
pour la Reconstruction Economique) committed for 1990 and after (credits,
investment and credit guarantees, grants and assistance) amounted to 4070
Mill. US$ EC member states' aid and 690 Mill. US$ community aid for Poland
(2240 Mill. US$ and 1200 Mill. US$ for Hungary, respectively) [Mihalyi,
Smolik, 1991]. Recipients of EC developing countries' aid. are tempted to
put these figures into perspective with the Lome IV volume of financial
resources of 12 000 Mill. ECU (equivalent to 15 300 Mill. US$ at 1990
conversion rates) to be shared among 69 countries and 450 Mill, people.
2 This does not only hold for NTBs like different standards but also for
tariffs. In Poland, for instance, the average weighted import duty for
industrial products is 18 per cent compared to 6 per cent in the EC
[Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, 1992].elements of rent-seeking to become active already at an early
stage of economic transformation. This is inconsistent with the
conditions under full membership.
Coming to the second test criterion, that is the opening of EC
markets to exports from the associates, there are some remarkable
improvements over previous preferential trade agreements. The
most important one is the inclusion of goods from the hard core
of EC agricultural and industrial protectionism like meat, grain,
rootcrops and dairy products, as well as of iron, steel and coal.
While these products are still subject to quotas with reduced
variable levies, tariff quotas or other restrictions, one cannot
deny that the Agreements have facilitated market access in
sectors in which the associates are likely to become competitive
soon.
3 It is important to note that breaking a small hole into
the wall of agricultural protectionism was achieved under
political pressure against the resistance of vested interest
groups.
Furthermore, quotas for textiles and clothing have been lifted
substantially, especially for outward processing which is a
starting point for linking EC companies to counterparts in the
associates and for future joint ventures and foreign investment
(see Table 1 for a time-table of phasing out EC restrictions
against imports from the associates).
It is just in strongly protected sectors where the associates
were able to translate preferential access into gains in trade
shares. For instance, between 1988 and 1991 the share of the
three associates in extra-EC imports of agricultural products
increased from 3.4 to 4.8 per cent, in textiles and clothing
3 In some products like meat of sheep, goats, pigs and chicken, or milk
powder, countries like Hungary and the CSFR are already among the leading
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cereals, at 50-75% reduced
variable levies and tariffs
with 8% quota growth,
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over three years
Note: Medium-term = structure of EC imports from Spain in 1990,
Long-term = structure of intra-EC trade in 1990.
Source: G. Pohl and P. Sorsa, The European Integration and the Developing World. The World Bank, Geneva Office,
January 1992, p. 95.from 3.7 to 5.2 per cent, and in iron and steel from 6.8 to 9.0
per cent. Gains in trade shares are more impressive for
relatively open sub-markets like Germany.
As concerns the heavily restricted imports after outward
processing (OE), the three associates comprised 46 per cent of
extra-EC imports of shoes under OE regimes in 1991 compared to 26
per cent in 1988 (from 27 per cent to 36 per cent in clothing' CN
62) [Langhammer, 1992]. In March 1992 when the Interim Agreements
came into force, OE and MFA quotas were lifted again
substantially thereby giving the associates a clear advantage in
market access vis-a-vis developing countries and other Eastern
European countries.
Such concessions visibly contrast with the refusal of the EC to
open its labour market. Apart from offering some modest options
to negotiate bilateral agreements on a limited number of East
European guest workers between individual EC member states and
the associates, labour mobility was not on the agenda.
It is the other side of integration widening that with the
almost complete collapse of intra-Eastern European trade
(including the CIS) , the EC has gained a new market for its
capital goods. EC shares in the associates ' imports are rapidly
rising, and the upper limits of import growth are only set by the
assessment of Western countries concerning the sustainability of
the associates' current account deficit.
Early successes on EC markets, however, cannot obscure the fact
that the Europe Agreements are still far from paving the way to
integration widening in terms of full membership. So are the as-
sociates from meeting the economic and institutional require-
ments . Unlike twenty years ago when the first enlargement was
implemented, integration widening is no longer confined to becom-
ing a member of the customs union. Today integration wideni-ngmeans membership in a common market (including factor mobility
and free trade in services) as well as complying with the basic
^objectives of the Maastricht Agreements (heading for the economic
and monetary union plus entry into the process of political
integration).
•With.macroeconomic instabilities still shaking the associates and
with ongoing rapid depreciation of the obsolete physical capital
stock-, the economic rationale calls for the gradual implementa-
,tion of the free trade area which later on would be upgraded to a
customs union. This is exactly what the Europe Agreements en-
visage.
Yet, as mentioned before, the political rationale of integration
widening could be in favour of accelerating the speed of
accession (accompanied by much higher financial and political
commitments of the EC) if the gradual approach would fail to
stabilise economic transformation, to contain social unrest at
•the Eastern border of the Community and to discourage migration.
III. The Second Generation Eastern European Countries: The
Mortgage of being Latecomers and Backyarders
In negotiating the Europe Agreements with the three countries
which geopolitically and culturally are classified as Central
European countries, the community has driven a wedge between the
former CMEA countries. For the Community, Eastern Europe
comprises Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and the former USSR
republics but not the CSFR, Poland and Hungary. In fact, by all
standards the former countries cannot contest the scores which
the latter group has already achieved. The process of
democratisation and economic transformation has been more
disruptive and fragile, the endowment with physical and human
.^capital- is poorer, the level of. per capita income is generally
,lower, inflationary tendencies are stronger, traditional economic10






























































(1) Percentage change of the previous year.
(2) GNP.
Source: KOPINT-DATORG (1992); AMEX Bank Review 1991, p. 4.11
relations to Western Europe are weaker, and, finally, the
countries suffer from locational disadvantages as they do not
share common borders with Western Europe.
4
Although the Community allowed these countries to participate in
some of the financial and economic privileges,
5 these privileges
mean little if they are compared to what is offered in the Europe
Agreements. But what matters more is the fact that the supply
constraints are much more severe in Bulgaria and Romania (not to
speak of Albania) than in the associates. As a result, shares in
extra-EC imports have either stagnated on the very low level
during the 1988-91 period (Bulgaria: 0.1-0.2 per cent) or even
declined (Romania: from 0.6 to 0.3 per cent).
To bridge the gap between the first and second generation
countries, the EC has started negotiations with Bulgaria and
Romania in 1992 on a similar type of institutionalised relations
as the Association Agreements. However, it is very likely that in
the new agreements with the Baltic states, Albania, Romania and
Bulgaria, the EC will deny the explicit reference to future full
membership given in the preamble of the Europe Agreements. As a
result, these agreements would be comparable to those negotiated
with Cyprus, Malta and Turkey in the sixties and seventies.
How large wealth differentials become within a widening European
integration if a country like Romania is taken as a yardstick is
highlighted by the following comparisons. The per capita income
(measured at purchasing power parities) of the poorest EC
country, Portugal, is 43 per cent of the income of the richest
country, Luxembourg. If the income of the poorest associate,
4 Some basic indicators of economic performance are presented in Table 2.
5 As concern trade policies, the Community has lifted quotas and has improved
the GSP coverage. Financially, the G-2 4 economic reconstruction programme
PHARE which initially was confined to Poland and Hungary (before being
widened to the CSFR) was extended to Bulgaria and Romania (and also to
former Yugoslavia).12
Poland, is measured in terms of the Luxembourg reference figure,
the gap amounts to 25 per cent, and it widens to even 19 per
cent, if the poorest second generation Eastern European country ,
Romania, (leaving Albania aside) is included (Table 2). Should EC
integration be widened to these countries, the Community would
ultimately change its nature from an initially efficiency-
oriented to an equity-oriented integration scheme in which
transfer policies would gain much more political weight.
IV. The Successor States of the USSR: No Candidates for
Integration Widening
The unprecedented and unanticipated collapse of the USSR and its
disintegration into fifteen entities (including three non-CIS
Baltic states) has given rise to a revision of the formerly very
reluctant stance of the Community towards trade with Russia and
the other states. Under the old system, trade was not only very
much restricted through EC import quotas, both Community-wide and
on the national level (the latter ones especially against energy
imports) but perhaps even more on the EC export side because of
security reasons (COCOM). Since 1989 many quotas against USSR-
originating goods were lifted under a ten-years trade and
commercial co-operation agreement with the former USSR (December
1989) . All specific EC quantitative restrictions were to - be
eliminated by the end of 1995 at the latest, except for a limited
number of products deemed sensitive (GATT, 1991, p. 73) . After
December 1991 the EC has found it obviously difficult to
formulate new policies for trade relations with the CIS which
increasingly drifts away from a customs union. The chaos in goods
pre inspection, rules of origin and customs valuation as well as
the suspicion of dumping might be technical reasons why by mid-
1992 even the GSP status has still been denied to CIS products.
Anyway, such concessions would be without much substance because
the CIS states predominantly export non-dutiable items like
primary commodities.Bibiiofhek
13 des Insfitufs fur Welhvirtschof;
Among the former USSR republics the three Baltic states are
likely to hold the best cards in their hands as far as their
chances are concerned to be considered as first candidates for
integration widening. Experience suggests that small resource-
poor economies are traditionally better prepared to launch and
implement substantive reforms to open their markets than large
resource-rich economies. Early attempts of Estonia, for instance,
to peg its new currency against the Deutschmark, supports this
experience though this policy might be too painful (in terms of
real income decline) to be sustainable. But beyond such entry
into a first round of an asymmetric free trade area with the Bal-
tic states, there is no scope for predictions.
While the process of institutionalising trade relations to the
other former USSR republics is as volatile as every single
economic factor in this area of the world, there is much evidence
that integration widening is not on the agenda no matter how
often political rhetorics touch upon it.
V. Integration Widening towards Eastern Europe without full
Membership: A Violation of the Non-Discrimination Rule?
It is controversial whether the Europe Agreements violate the
GATT principle of non-discrimination because of inconsistency
with Art. 24 GATT. While an economist like Lester Thurow
interprets Art. 24 in a legalist way and thus argues that
"associate membership in the common market in 1,000 percent
^illegal under the GATT" [Thurow, 1991, p. 5] because it would not
lead to a political union, other researchers pragmatically look
upon the trade-diverting effects as the major criterion
•[Jacquemin, Sapir, 1991, p. 169] . They argue that EC-Eastern
Europe trade relations are determined by "natural" proximity
factors such as geographical distance and cultural similarity
-(that is, along the gravity model type of arguments a la14
Havrylyshyn/Pritchett) and that therefore trade diversion effects
would be less relevant.
Empirical evidence suggests truth to be "in the middle of road".
Proximity factors are ineffective if quantitative restrictions
decide on the access to the market. This is the case for sectors
like textiles and clothing and CAP products. Of course, trade
diversion is low in the latter products because EC markets have
remained as closed for third country suppliers after the Europe
Agreements as they were before. Thus, imports are likely to be
expanded at the expense of marginal domestic supply. However,
imports from the associates in meat and dairy products still
account for less than 2 per cent of domestic supply. Textiles and
clothing on the other hand constitute real access advantages for
the associates as quotas were lifted more rapidly and more
substantially than for other third country suppliers. To
translate such advantages into gains in import market penetration
ratios, the associates must be able to exhaust the quotas. The
1991 EC trade data for import permits under MFA categories
(prior to the extended quotas under the Interim Agreements) yield
relatively high average utilisation rates in so-called hyper-
sensitive categories (MFA categories 1-8) only for the CSFR
(about 94 per cent) while they were much lower for Poland and
Hungary as well as for Romania and Bulgaria [Langhammer, 1992,
Table Al] . As utilisation rates vary strongly by individual MFA
categories, average rates are not overly conclusive.
Should these rates increase for 1992 and the following years and
should an improved market access be denied to third countries
(the latter as a result of a failure to dismantle import barriers
multilaterally under the GATT), trade diversion could become a
more serious issue than today. Yet, it is likely that it will be
confined to the first generation countries being the more
competitive suppliers than the other countries.15
Complaints of third countries ("impairment and nullification of
benefits under the GATT") will lead to more specific tests of
GATT consistency. In general, however, the EC may resort to Art.
XXIV: 5(c) GATT which labels a period of ten years as
"reasonable" for the implementation of a free trade area. Except
for the agricultural sector, the Interim Agreements heading for a
Free Trade Area within this period would therefore be ' GATT
consistent in legal terms.
VI. Conclusions
EC integration widening in the nineties is no longer a process
which is limited to the geographical extension of the free trade
area. Nor is full membership confined to the accession to the
customs union or the common market. Candidates for full
membership must also meet non-economic criteria like multi-party
democracy, political stability and cohesion, or ethnic
homogeneity. Fitting into the framework of a future political
union, is an essential prerequisite of membership. But even if
such prerequisite are fulfilled, this does not imply a fixed time
schedule of guaranteed accession. Integration widening is also
conditioned by the success of integration deepening. Unless there
.is full endorsement of the Maastricht Agreements by the
electorate of the Twelve, integration widening towards new
members will be postponed.
Among the Central and Eastern European countries, the political
rationale favours the acceleration of a process towards full
membership for Poland and Hungary after the accession of the EFTA
countries. The economic rationale will be reluctant to support
. such acceleration. Such reluctance would be justified with the
high amount of transfer payments needed and the concomitant
change of the Community from an efficiency-oriented scheme to an
equity-oriented one.16
The divorce of the Czech and Slovak parts of the CSFR will
probably lead to a reassessment of the political implications of
the Europe Agreement with the former CSFR. Both economically and
politically, a bone fide credit to apply the conditions of the
Europe Agreement to a Czech Republic seems larger than with
respect to an economically more backward and politically unknown
Slovak republic. The more this republic would become economically
and politically unstable, the more it is likely that it would be
denied equal treatment as the Czech Republic.
The second group of Eastern European countries will have no
chance for a privileged associated status (including an option
for full membership). Free trade provisions for the industrial
sector will be subject to special regulations taking into account
the infant industry character of the domestic industries in these
countries.
Finally, there is no model of integration widening available for
the CIS states. This is not only due to political disorder and
economic backwardness. Even in the narrow field of tariff
concessions, barriers to integration widening are numerous. For
instance, conceding GSP treatment and special trade preferences
is ineffective if the bulk of export supply is in non-dutiable
primary commodities. As all individual CIS states are not yet
clearly defined customs areas, the EC may shy away from any sort
of trade concessions at the moment in order not to give
incentives to circumvent EC customs regulations against
individual third countries, for instance in textiles. On the
other hand, the CIS itself is paralysed and has no competence as
a negotiation partner.
To conclude, in the medium run integration widening will be con-
fined to the three associates. Political rationale will be in fa-
vour to accelerating this process towards full membership while
the economic rationale will call for more cautiousness. Ultima-
tely, it is the success of integration deepening in the EC-12 and17
of the political and economic transformation in the associates
which determines the speed of shifting EC borders to the East.18
REFERENCES
AMEX Bank Review. Vol. 18, No. 7, 18 September 1991.
GATT: Trade Policy Review. European Communities, Vol. I (Geneva:
GATT, June 1991).
Havrylyshyn, Oleh, Lant Pritchett: European Trade Patterns After
the Transition. PRE Working Paper, WPS 748, International
Economics Department, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.,
September 1991.
Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, Elzbieta: "Implications of the Association
Agreement with the European Communities for Poland". In:
Krzysztov Kaczynski, Elzbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (Eds.),
Reintegration of Poland into the West European Economy (Warsaw:
Foreign Trade Research Institute, 1992), pp. 73-94.
KOPINT-DATORG: Economic Trends in Eastern Europe. Budapest, Vol.
1, No. 1, 1992.
Langhammer, Rolf J.: Die Auswirkungen der EG-Handelspolitik
gegeniiber Mittel- und Osteuropa. Vortrag gehalten anlafilich der
55. Mitgliederversammlung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft deutscher
wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Forschungsinstitute, Bonn, 14-15
May 1992. Forthcoming in "Beihefte der Konjunkturpolitik", Heft
39, Berlin 1992.
Mihalyi, Peter, Joseph E. Smolik: "Lending is not Enough: An
Assessment of Western Support for Reforms in Hungary and
Poland", 1989-1990". Communist Economies, Vol. 3, 1991, No. 2,
pp. 201-219.
Pohl, Gerhard, Piritta Sorsa: European Integration and the
Developing World. Geneva Office, The World Bank, January 1992
(mimeo).
Sapir, Andre, Alexis Jacquemin: "Western Europe, Eastern Europe,
and the World Economy. Europe Post-1992: Internal and External
Liberalization". The American Economic Review, Vol. 81, 1991,
. No. 2, pp. 166-170.
Thurow, Lester: "Long March to Global Economy". The World Paper,
Boston, Vol. XIII, November 1991, No. 11.